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FRIENDS OF THE EARTH,
FOES OF FEDERALISM
MICHAEL S. GREVE*
I
In its January 2000 decision in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,1 the United States Supreme Court
re-empowered environmental interest groups to enforce the nation’s
environmental laws through public fines, whether or not the plaintiffenforcers have suffered any tangible injury. Six members of the
Bench joined Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court.
Only Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, joined by Justice Clarence
Thomas.
Laidlaw has almost uniformly been viewed as something of a
surprise because it breaks a string of restrictive environmental stand2
ing decisions. Equally surprising, the decision was issued against the
background of highly publicized events that have reminded us of the
costs and dangers attendant to empowering unelected, unaccountable
law enforcers to do the public’s business. An effectively unremovable
Independent Counsel nearly brought down the President of the
United States. Tort lawyers have exacted some $240 billion from tobacco producers and their consumers, effectively imposing a tax no
citizen or elected official ever voted for. Gun manufacturers, managed health care providers, and other industries have been targeted
with similar litigation campaigns.
Misgivings over unleashing law enforcers from executive control
should apply with even greater force to advocacy groups that enforce
environmental laws as “private attorneys general.” Unlike the real
Kenneth Starr, the “green” Ken Starrs are not appointed by anyone,
and they conduct their law enforcement business without public scru* John G. Searle Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Ph.D. (Government), Cornell
University, 1987.
1. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
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tiny or government supervision. And, unlike the multimillionaire
anti-tobacco lawyers who are doing the bidding of the (elected) state
attorneys general and legislatures they bought and paid for, ecological
law enforcers lack any measure of public accountability. In short, environmental citizen suits involve—centrally, not incidentally—the
delegation of governmental authority to private parties and the diversion of public funds into private hands.
Laidlaw, however and alas, roundly ignores questions of public
accountability and responsibility. This, too, is a surprise: the Supreme
Court’s conservative-centrist majority has generally placed a premium on public accountability and responsibility. The Court’s federalism jurisprudence is the most prominent illustration of these
themes. In treating environmental citizen suits as utterly unproblematic, the Laidlaw majority breaks with more than a few environmental
standing decisions.
Most attorneys and legal scholars probably think of standing and
federalism issues as separate fields, and, perhaps, the Justices, too,
compartmentalize constitutional law in that fashion. As shown below, however, standing and federalism are in fact quite closely connected. (Indeed, Laidlaw itself involved a non-trivial federalism is3
sue, albeit one the Supreme Court chose to ignore.) Legal taxonomy
alone cannot explain why Laidlaw studiously avoids the issue of political responsibility that plays a central role in the Court’s federalism
decisions. Nor, this paper argues, can this departure be attributed to
a judicial perception of environmental values and their private enforcers as uniquely important, efficient, or irreplaceable. The Laidlaw majority makes no mention of environmental values and treats
citizen suits as simply an interest group vehicle.
What seems to be at work in Laidlaw is judicial caution—to my
mind, excessive caution. In re-asserting constitutional norms that enhance political responsibility, the Court has often lacked the nerve to
confront entrenched political coalitions and their congressional patrons. Environmental citizen suits enjoy firm congressional support,
and they serve as an institutional support system for potent interest
groups. Confronted in Laidlaw with that reality, the centrist Justices
backed off. In so doing, they underestimated and perhaps undermined the force of the Court’s agenda for a more responsible government.

3. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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II
Laidlaw was one among hundreds of citizen suits brought by environmental advocacy organizations under the Clean Water Act. The
suit was filed in 1992 over numerous violations of a permit governing
the discharge of pollutants from a wastewater treatment site into the
North Tyger River in South Carolina.4 Three plaintiff-organizations
submitted affidavits and testimony of several of their members, who
averred that their “concerns” over water pollution near the Laidlaw
site had prompted them to refrain from certain recreational activities.
Although the District Court (ruling on the defendants’ summary
judgment motion) could find “no demonstrated proof of harm to the
environment,”5 the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs’
averments established the sort of “particularized injury” required to
support standing.6 Moreover, the Supreme Court determined that
private citizen-plaintiffs have standing to seek statutory civil penalties, payable to the U.S. Treasury, for environmental violations, so
long as the penalties are likely to deter future violations that might
injure the plaintiffs and unless intervening factors have rendered the
case moot.7 The Court then remanded the case for further consideration of the mootness question.
Laidlaw presented the Supreme Court’s liberal wing with a rare
opportunity to reverse a decade of decisions restricting environmental
standing. Such an opportunity, one would think, might carry with it a
reminder of the important public purposes of environmental citizen
suits. However, in contrast to the lofty pronouncements on “civic
participation” and “environmental values” that characterized the
8
standing decisions of the environmental era some three decades ago,
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is laconic, even pedantic, and makes no
mention of principles or public purposes.9
4. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 592
(D.S.C. 1997).
5. See id. at 602 (“permit violations at issue in this citizen suit did not result in any health
risk or environmental harm.”).
6. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183-84.
7. See id. at 185-87.
8. The locus classicus is Judge Skelly Wright’s pronouncement in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (“Our duty is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”).
9. A handful of Supreme Court decisions run counter to my predictions concerning the declining significance of environmental values in the case law. See MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE DEMISE
OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 67 (1996) (analyzing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter,
515 U.S. 687 (1995)). While Laidlaw’s outcome may suggest a renaissance of ecological values, its
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To an extent, the majority opinion’s tone simply reflects the
author’s judicial temperament. Ginsburg’s more loquacious colleagues, however, obviously had an opportunity to concur and expostulate on the important purposes of citizen suits. They failed to do so
even though Justice Scalia’s dissent very much invites, if not compels,
a reply at the level of constitutional principle. Justice Scalia sharply
criticized the majority for accepting as a constitutionally recognizable
“injury in fact” environmental “concerns” which, in the case at hand,
10
demonstrably lacked a basis in fact. Mere apprehensions, it appears,
now suffice to confer standing. The majority fails to respond to this
criticism.11
Similarly, the majority claims that the deterrent effect of public
penalties can redress an injury to private litigants. Yet more implausibly, the majority avers that the Supreme Court’s precedents bar the
private enforcement of public penalties only when the penalties are
12
sought for wholly past (rather than continuing) violations. Justice
Scalia makes a compelling argument in his dissent that the enforcement of quintessentially public fines amounts to a wholesale transfer
of public authority to private advocacy groups.13 Again, the majority
declines to respond and to defend its obviously problematic position.
The majority’s silence illustrates that environmental citizen suits
have for some time been a policy in search of a purpose. When introtenor and logic do not.
10. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. The Laidlaw majority consistently refers to the plaintiffs alleged injuries as “concerns.” See
id. at 183-84. Attempting to give meaning to this with the weasel word, the majority distinguishes
the individual plaintiffs’ “entirely reasonable” fears from mere “subjective apprehensions,” Id. at
184. The fact that those fears were proven to be baseless does not bother the majority. For purposes of constitutional standing, it appears to make no difference whether the plaintiff’s harm is real
or just his imagination running away with him.
12. If the incidental benefit that plaintiffs derive from the general deterrent effect of public
fines suffices to confer standing, the “redressability” prong of traditional standing analysis has lost its
purpose of separating the plaintiff from the world at large. Wholly unpersuasive is the majority’s
contention that Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), contemplates or
permits such a latitudinarian approach and bars only the private collection of fines for wholly past
violations. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 188. Steel Co. distinguishes wholly past violations from continuing violations with respect to standing to obtain injunctive relief—appropriately so, because in
that context, the timing matters. See 523 U.S. at 108-09. In contrast, the question of whether civil
penalties will or will not deter future misconduct and so “redress” a plaintiff’s alleged injury has absolutely nothing to do with the timing of the underlying violations. Steel Co. holds—categorically,
correctly, and prior to any discussion of wholly past versus on-going violations—that civil penalties
payable to the Treasury cannot redress a private injury. See id. at 106 (“[T]he civil penalties authorized by the statute . . . might be viewed as a sort of compensation or redress to respondent if they
were payable to respondent. But they are not.”) (citation omitted).
13. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 209-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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duced into American law, such lawsuits were advertised as a means of
enhancing public participation in environmental decision-making and
14
of curing an alleged law enforcement deficit. Both arguments have
proven untenable. The participants in citizen suits aren’t ordinary
citizens; they are lawyers and advocates. The enforcement pattern
may have advantages (such as professionalism and expertise), but it
renders the participatory rationale preposterous. As for the enforcement deficit, not one more-than-anecdotal study in three decades has
shown that citizen suits actually improve environmental policy, never
mind the environment. Much of the empirical evidence suggests the
opposite:15 There is no reason to believe that the enforcement of a
centralized command and control regime by a gaggle of private attorneys general, whose enforcement priorities lack a connection to environmental harms and benefits, will produce efficient results.16
Laidlaw itself illustrates that citizen suits have nothing to do with
their (once-) proffered rationales. It is a “citizen” suit in name only:
the individual citizen-plaintiffs participated only because, and to the
extent that, the environmental interest groups who brought the case
needed to satisfy the pleading requirements. The environmental
harm consisted principally of the defendants’ monitoring and recordkeeping violations, along with unintentional violations of a carelessly
drafted permit whose stringency far exceeded federal requirements.
Far from being a habitual lawbreaker, the company undertook serious compliance efforts.17 The possibility of future environmental
harm from Laidlaw’s treatment plant is remote: the facility was closed
some time before the Supreme Court granted certiorari. By the time
the case reached the Supreme Court, it had shed its thin environmental veneer and revealed its naked purpose: money.
14. See Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 339 (1990).
15. See, e.g., R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS (1983); Jonathan H. Adler,
Stand Or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 39 (2001); Greve, supra note 14.
16. Private enforcement might be efficient if (a) violations of the rules that are being enforced (such as the permit system of the Clean Water Act) were an adequate proxy for environmental harm and (b) it were possible to direct private enforcers through appropriate incentives toward welfare-enhancing enforcement actions. The first of these stringent conditions
does not obtain as a matter of empirical fact. See William F. Pedersen, Turning the Tide on
Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69, 72-82 (1988) (noting that the Clean Water Act permit system has no regulatory link to water quality). The second is impossible to satisfy. See Greve,
supra note 14, at 343-45.
17. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Issues Raised by Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services: Access to the Courts for Environmental Plaintiffs, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 207
(2001).
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Once substantive policy rationales have fallen by the wayside,
the defense of citizen suits collapses into an unqualified assertion of
legislative supremacy. Congress, the argument runs, has established
citizen suits as a principal means of environmental law enforcement,
and nothing in the Constitution should induce the federal courts to
second-guess that policy choice. “Congress has found,” the Laidlaw
majority avers, “that civil penalties in Clean Water Act cases . . . deter
future violations. This congressional determination warrants judicial
18
attention and respect.”
Whatever congressional “findings” may exist on the question of
whether public penalties—payable to the U.S. Treasury—can redress
a private injury, they aren’t cited in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion. In
any event, they would have no bearing on the constitutional standing
question. Congress can waive “prudential” standing limitations (such
as the zone of interest test) that, in the absence of legislative action,
would prompt a judicial denial of standing to sue. No legislative finding,
determination, or statute, however, can possibly abrogate the constitu19
tional standing minima of Article III. The question in Laidlaw was
whether the plaintiffs had satisfied the constitutional minima. Justice
Ginsburg’s appeal to judicial deference begs that question.
In permitting Congress to define the boundaries of Article III
standing, the Laidlaw Court sanctions an interest group bargain,
rather than a public purpose. In an empirical study ten years ago, I
concluded that citizen suits constitute a system of transfer payments
20
to environmental interest groups. Private environmental law enforcement is effectively limited to a cartel of interest groups, who are
drawn into the enforcement market by the availability of attorney’s
fees and civil penalties. While the penalties are technically payable to
the U.S. Treasury, both the enforcers and the defendants gain from
negotiating a private transfer payment in lieu of a (higher) penalty
payment. Thus, the availability of civil penalties enables environ18. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185.
19. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992):
[T]here is absolutely no basis for making the Article III injury turn on the source
of the asserted right. Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our
cases, they would be disregarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct role of the Third Branch. (emphasis added).
The principle applies regardless of whether the constitutional minima are those of “concrete
injury” or, as in Laidlaw, of redressability. For a well-argued but, to my mind, ultimately unpersuasive defense of judicial deference on the point at issue, see Harold J. Krent, Laidlaw: Redressing the Law of Redressability, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. POL’Y F. 85 (2001).
20. See GREVE, supra note 14.
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mental interest groups to divert public fines to private uses. This diversion is the most unambiguous empirical effect of citizen suits and,
there being no other plausible explanation for the policy, quite
probably their intended congressional purpose.
While Laidlaw itself did not involve a transfer payment from defendant to plaintiff (which would have terminated the case), the
Court was certainly aware of that widespread practice: the empirical
findings just mentioned are cited and summarized in Justice Scalia’s
22
dissent. Yet again, though, the majority did not bother to respond.
Knowing full well that environmental citizen suits are essentially an
interest group arrangement, the majority paid its “attention and respect” not to a congressional policy determination or value, but to
congressional and interest group politics.
III
The judicial ratification of legislative and interest group bargains
is a perfectly ordinary phenomenon, and the point of judicial deference vis-a-vis the Congress. Over the past five years, however, the
Supreme Court has proven willing to enforce at least some constitutional limitations on such bargains. Federalism cases from United
States v. Lopez23 to last Term’s decisions in Kimel v. Florida Board of
24
25
Regents and United States v. Morrison illustrate the Court’s assertiveness. Laidlaw breaks with the pattern.
The connections between federalism and standing are sufficiently
26
close to have occurred to the Laidlaw Court during oral argument. A
cursory examination of a few common (and interrelated) themes—
congressional supremacy, the role of private litigants, the scope of ex21. Here and in the original article, the point is not that environmental law enforcers have
bad or illicit motives (although the incentive structure of citizen-suit provisions does not preclude profiteering). The central problem is that environmental law enforcers have no reliable,
external measure of environmental harm. In choosing enforcement levels, targets, and remedies, they must therefore fall back on other criteria, and those can only be the internal costs and
benefits to the organization.
22. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 205-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School Zones Act violates the Commerce Clause).
24. 528 U.S. 62 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages under Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
25. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the civil remedies provision of the Violence Against
Women Act exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment).
26. Official Transcript at 7-8, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs, Inc., 528
U.S. 167 (2000) (No. 98-822).
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ecutive power, and the value of political responsibility—illustrates
both the connections between the two areas and the ways in which
Laidlaw deviates from the general run of the Supreme Court’s federalism cases.
A. Congressional Supremacy
As already noted, Laidlaw implies an assertion of congressional
supremacy. In the federalism arena, that premise is no longer operative. The Tenth Amendment protects state governments from federal
27
“commandeering;” the Eleventh Amendment, from private lawsuits
for damages. Even under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment—until recently, realms of virtually unlimited congressional authority—the Supreme Court has re-asserted its authority and
determined that Congress may not create a Constitution parallel to
28
the one we actually have. Laidlaw, in contrast, would allow Congress to establish its own environmental Constitution.
Suppose Congress created a permanent Independent Ecological
Counsel. Effectively un-removable, this Counsel would have roving
authority to investigate, prosecute, and try lawbreaking without the
concurrence and even over the objections of the Attorney General.
Additionally, assume that Counsel had authority to swap the lawbreakers’ penalties to the Treasury for ecological “mitigation payments” in Fairfax County or for that matter Tahiti. While Justice
Ginsburg does not suggest or endorse such a policy option, it would
be fully consistent with her opinion in Laidlaw.
This lack of judicial imagination—the failure to consider what
else Congress might do under an expansive judicial definition of its
powers—separates Laidlaw from the Supreme Court’s federalism decisions. The Gun Free School Zones Act struck down in United States
v. Lopez was a symbolic enactment, and hardly a menace to republican government. Printz v. United States invalidated certain provisions
of the federal “Brady Act,” which commandeered state and local law
enforcement officers, on an interim basis, to administer federal gun
registration requirements; those requirements, too, were far too mod29
est to eviscerate state and local government. Both Lopez and Printz
reveal a profound judicial suspicion of congressional schemes and intentions. The Supreme Court worried precisely about “what else” the
27. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 916 (1997).
28. See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Lopez, 514 U.S.
549.
29. See Printz, 521 U.S. 898.
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Congress might be tempted to do in the absence of some constitutional barrier to its Commerce Clause authority (in Lopez) and a
hard and precise injunction against federal “commandeering” (in
Printz).30 That sensibility is wholly missing from the Laidlaw opinion.
B. Private Litigation
The Supreme Court’s federalism cases seek to curb private litigation or, more precisely, congressional attempts to mobilize private
litigants for federal purposes. That objective is most transparent in
Eleventh Amendment cases that provide states with sovereign immu31
nity protection against damage suits under federal statutes. It also
underlies the invalidation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
in City of Boerne v. Flores and cases that narrowly construe private
rights of action under federal law.32
To be sure, the federalism cases just mentioned protect state and,
to some extent, local governments, rather than private defendants
like Laidlaw. But the Court’s solicitude for the dignity of the states
cannot fully explain the difference between those cases and Laidlaw.
For one thing, much environmental citizen litigation is conducted
33
against state and local governments. Moreover, Richard Pierce has
observed that Laidlaw itself raises a serious federalism issue—which
the Court chose to ignore.34
Having received the plaintiffs’ notice of intent to sue, Laidlaw
persuaded the state of South Carolina to initiate an enforcement action in state court. The parties settled that lawsuit for a $100,000
30. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 926-28 (rejecting as insufficiently precise and effective a
distinction that would permit federal reliance on state officials for law enforcement but not for
policy-making functions); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (“[I]f we were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without
power to regulate.”).
31. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (1999) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Fair Labor Standards Act); College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that the
federal patent and trademark statutes cannot validly abrogate states’ sovereign immunity); Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act does not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity).
32. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507; see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (holding that the Social Security Act provisions mandating certain state actions concerning enforcement
of child support obligations unenforceable through private litigation).
33. It is an interesting speculation whether Laidlaw might have come out differently, had the
defendant been, say, a municipal waste treatment facility. State defendants, of course, are off the
hook in any event, since they enjoy sovereign immunity from (citizen) suits for civil fines.
34. See Pierce, supra note 17.
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penalty and the company’s promise to make “every effort” to comply
with its permit obligations. Under the citizen-suit provision of the
Clean Water Act (and most other such provisions), a “diligent” state
enforcement action bars citizen suits.35 Environmental advocacy
groups nonetheless sued in federal court, claiming that the state’s
prosecution was not diligent and its settlement with Laidlaw, effectively collusive. The District Court allowed the lawsuit to proceed.
Laidlaw’s actions were plainly calculated to bar a citizen suit.
For example, Laidlaw’s attorneys wrote the state court complaint
against the company and even paid the filing fee. As Pierce has
pointed out, however, the record indicates that South Carolina was in
fact quite serious about bringing the Laidlaw facility into compli36
ance. Judicial permission of a citizen suit under such circumstances
suggests a free-wheeling second-guessing of the state’s enforcement
discretion.
If this does not seem problematic, suppose an environmental
statute authorized “affected” citizens to sue a state or a local government directly (for injunctive and other relief, such as civil fines) and,
after a sixty-day notice period, to demand the “diligent” enforcement
of federal law. Under such a provision, it is very unlikely that plain37
tiffs could state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The import of the Laidlaw litigation, though, is precisely that the same result
can be achieved in a more round-about way—that is, through citizen
suits that force the (state) government’s hand.38 Although not explicitly holding so, the Supreme Court’s decision suggests that Congress
may authorize citizen-plaintiffs to press state governments into exercising their enforcement authority—to exercise it in the first instance,
and to exercise it in a particular fashion.
C. Executive Power
In considering the rather trivial federal “commandeering” provisions of the Brady Act, the Printz majority argued that federal commandeering would ultimately enable Congress to circumvent and
35. See Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
36. See Pierce, supra note 17, at 232-33.
37. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430-32 (1987)
(holding that a right must be “sufficiently specific and definite” to be capable of judicial enforcement). It seems doubtful that a private right to “diligent law enforcement” would meet that standard. If so, the hypothetical provision presents an Article III case or controversy problem.
38. One might object that a state can always choose not to bring an enforcement action and
to let a citizen suit go forward. Either way, however, the citizen suit will have forced the state to
cede control over its enforcement program.
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39

emasculate the Executive. Why have a United States Department of
Justice if state and local law enforcers can be pressed into federal
40
service?
Citizen suits pose the same problem, except more so. The federal officials who are entrusted with the enforcement of environmental laws are subject to congressional oversight and budget control.
They are accountable to the Executive and, ultimately, to the public,
and their enforcement priorities and incentives will, at least to some
extent, reflect public preferences. None of this is true of selfappointed public citizens. Earlier standing cases indicated serious judicial misgivings about the effects of citizen standing on executive
41
power. The Laidlaw Court, in contrast, steered clear of the executive power question—in a manner so strained as to border on the
42
comical. Had the Court considered the issue, it would still have
reached the same result.43
D. Political Responsibility
As noted, the Supreme Court’s recent federalism cases evidence
a judicial preoccupation with political responsibility and accountability. Shared, “cooperative” authority produces an irresponsible, meddlesome government and, at the same time, disenfranchises citizens,
who can no longer identify the culprits behind government schemes
(much less vote them out of office). The point emerges most clearly
in Tenth Amendment cases. Printz states it as follows:
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress
can take credit for “solving” problems without having to ask their
constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And
39. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 917-18 (1998).
40. Printz is not based entirely, and probably not even primarily, on this argument. However,
it is not too much to read the opinion of the Court as an implicit endorsement of the “unitary executive” celebrated in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997
SUP. CT. REV. 199, 226 (“[O]ne might read Printz [. . .] as an attempted end run around the Court’s
rejection of [Scalia’s] extreme unitarian position in Morrison v. Olson.”).
41. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992).
42. During oral argument, the Court assured itself that plaintiff-appellants’ counsel had not
raised the issue in his petition for certiorari. Official Transcript at 8, Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (No. 98822). Competent attorneys are generally reluctant to raise constitutional defenses to their clients’
position.
43. Justice Kennedy’s brief concurrence suggests that he might have decided Laidlaw differently had Article II concerns been presented. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, no other Justice joined that concurrence.
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even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of tak44
ing the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.

The dissenters in Printz argued that the majority holding would
entail an unintended consequence: by disabling the federal government from enlisting state officials in implementing federal programs,
“the Court creates incentives for the National Government to ag45
grandize itself” —that is, to expand its own enforcement capabilities.
Though not spelled out in Printz, the sur-reply is obvious: The federal
government would be very reluctant to aggrandize itself, were it made
to bear the political costs of its schemes.
The more ambitious the regulatory scheme, the greater the legislators’ inclination to divorce ambitions from responsibility—to take
credit for aspirations and occasional accomplishments while avoiding
blame for costs and dislocations. As even strong supporters of environmental values have shown, environmental regulation is rife with—
and driven by—blame-shifting, political collusion, and irresponsibil46
ity. Within that regime, the most egregious policy instrument is the
citizen suit. Compared to a horde of “self-appointed mini-EPAs,”47
the state implementation of conditional preemption statutes (and
even the unelected, made-up bodies that have come to populate the
environmental scenery, such as air quality management districts and
the Ozone Transport Commission) look like models of political accountability. In Laidlaw, the quest for political responsibility stops at
the water’s edge.
IV
The responsibility train of thought was set in motion by Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy, whose earlier pronouncements provided the
48
Justices O’Connor and
basis for Justice Scalia’s Printz opinion.
44. Printz, 521 U.S. at 929-30.
45. See id. at 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 976-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 233
(1990); R. Shep Melnick, Pollution Deadlines and the Coalition for Failure, 75 PUB. INTEREST 123
(1984); David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 740 (1983).
47. See Laidlaw, 520 U.S. at 209 (Scalia, J., dissenting.) (“A Clean Water Act plaintiff pursuing
civil penalties acts as a self-appointed mini-EPA.”).
48. Compare the passage quoted earlier with New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167
(1992) (holding that federal commandeering of state governments undermines political accountability) (opinion by O’Connor, J.), and with United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (“Were the
Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern . . . the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility
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Kennedy, as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist, are members of the Supreme Court’s federalist majority. In Laidlaw, all three signed an
opinion that sets aside the constitutional values that drive their federalism campaign. Notwithstanding the contrast at this level of constitutional values and principles, however, Laidlaw fits the general pattern of the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence in a tactical
sense.
Fearful that a full-blown federalism revival might provoke a political backlash, the Supreme Court has re-asserted federalism norms
in a piecemeal, pragmatic and, at times, overtly constituency-driven
49
fashion. First, the Court has advanced federalism when the statutes
at issue have been marginal, symbolic, and more akin to a legislative
press release than an operational law. The Gun Free School Zones
Act of Lopez fame, the Brady bill invalidated in Printz, and the civil
remedies provision of the Violence Against Women Act that was invalidated in United States v. Morrison all fit this description.50 Second,
the Supreme Court has re-enforced federalism when Congress has
ventured into new areas that had been left, and can safely be left, to
the states. Crime control (the issue of Lopez) is the clearest example:
unlike economic regulation, where a curtailment of national authority
might spark a “race to the bottom” among the states, crime prevention poses no danger that the states, left to their own devices, will fail
to regulate. (The federalism problem, if one exists, is that the states
might over-regulate in an effort to “export” criminal activity to more
lenient states.)51 Third, the Supreme Court has promoted federalism
while leaving Congress alternative means of accomplishing its stated
objectives. Tenth Amendment “commandeering” cases in particular
only go to the unconstitutional means of federal regulation; the ends
(such as gun registration, in Printz) are presumed constitutional, and
may be pursued in some other, constitutional fashion (such as legislation under the Spending Clause). Finally, and most important, the
Supreme Court has tended to advance federalism when the losing political coalitions are too marginal or disparate to marshal a concerted

would become illusory.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
49. See MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD
HAPPEN 79-86 (1999).
50. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz, 521 U.S. 898; Lopez, 514
U.S. 549.
51. See Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 167, 179-80 (1996).
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52

counter-attack in Congress.
In Laidlaw, the Court met an entrenched, potent constituency—and blinked.
The run of environmental standing cases confirms this analysis.
Starting in 1987, the Supreme Court limited citizen suits to claims
53
over on-going (rather than wholly past) violations. Subsequently,
the Court has insisted that environmental interest groups may challenge only final agency actions, as distinct from agency policies and
54
55
deliberations; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife emphasized the constitutional obstacles to generalized citizen standing and imposed more
stringent pleading requirements; and further limited, only two years
56
ago, injunctive remedies in citizen suits over past violations. While
those decisions (especially Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife) were emphatic about the constitutional considerations, they affected the actual pattern and practice of environmental interest litigation only at
the margin. In Laidlaw, the Supreme Court confronted the hard political and economic core of environmental citizen standing—the exaction of transfer payments to environmental interest groups.57 If
plaintiffs had been denied standing in Laidlaw, environmental interest groups would have been frozen out of the enforcement process.
Recognizing as much, the Court shrunk back and distinguished its
precedents on narrow, disingenuous grounds.
Citizen suits are the warp and woof of a huge regulatory regime.
Once heralded as a singularly important national commitment, that
regime has since come to be recognized as an interest-group-ridden,
58
monstrously inefficient bore. Even so, the private enforcement of
that regime seems unassailable. Professor Cass Sunstein, for a
prominent example, has denounced citizen suits as “part and parcel of
a largely unsuccessful system of command-and-control regulation”—
only to peddle in the same breath (or at least article) legislative pro52. See Jeffrey Rosen, Hyperactive, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 2000, at 20-21 (criticizing
the Supreme Court’s tendency to target its federalism fire at marginal constituencies that lobby
for symbolic enactments).
53. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
54. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)
55. 594 U.S. 555 (1992).
56. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
57. National journalists and editorialists recognized that Laidlaw was essentially “about”
keeping the legal world safe for environmental interest groups. See, e.g., William Glaberson,
Novel Antipollution Tool is Being Upset by Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1999, at A1; A Win for
the Environment, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2000, at B6.
58. Compare Judge Wright’s famous pronouncement, quoted supra note 8, with Justice
Scalia’s also-famous rejoinder: “A lot of heralded purposes ought to get lost or misdirected. . . .
Yesterday’s herald is tomorrow’s bore.” Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 897 (1983).
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nly to peddle in the same breath (or at least article) legislative proposals to defend that part and parcel from Justice Scalia’s wholesale
59
assault. In the same spirit, the Laidlaw majority bows to the will of
Congress. Private environmental law enforcement has been around
for so long, and its beneficiaries and their congressional patrons are
so entrenched, that the thought of making do without it becomes unsettling or disorienting.
V
Considering the political hazards of re-establishing structural
constitutional norms, much can be said for judicial pragmatism and
60
Precisely because citizen suits are the interest
incrementalism.
group detritus of since-subsided political passions, they have powerful
defenders. A Supreme Court bent on a piecemeal restoration of responsibility-enhancing rules and doctrines should and perhaps must
steer clear of such targets.61
Judicial caution, however, has a downside. Already, influential
commentators have criticized the Supreme Court’s federalism juris62
prudence for a selective hostility to marginal constituencies. The
Supreme Court may yet provide those critics with ammunition: a continued disavowal of the principles of political responsibility and accountability—when the chips are down—would suggest that those
principles can’t be all that important to begin with. In that event, the
Court’s piecemeal, painstaking federalism reconstruction would begin
to look whimsical rather than incremental.
Similarly, a serious judicial agenda for federalism and, more
broadly, for political responsibility must at some point challenge the
voters and their elected representatives to re-examine cherished but,
in the end, irresponsible and infantile preconceptions. Environmental
regulation in particular rests on the premise that an infinitely complex, fragile, and precious environment can be protected only through
63
a centralized, “Soviet-style” command-and-control scheme. But we
59. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, ‘Injuries’ and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 221, 233-35 (1992).
60. I have said some of it myself. See GREVE, supra note 49, at 81-82.
61. See Jeremy A. Rabkin’s prescient observation: “The logic of Justice Scalia’s articulation of standing requirements in Lujan may go beyond what the Court can actually insist upon
because it goes beyond what Congress can accept.” Jeremy A. Rabkin, Government Lawyering:
The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 201 (1998).
62. See Rosen, supra note 52.
63. See Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1985) (criticizing the existing “Soviet-style centralized planning for
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are suspicious of such schemes, and our politicians do not dare to endorse them. Hence, we have assuaged our collective conscience by
combining a pretense of centralized environmental control with a pretense of concerned citizen participation. The result is neither policy
coherence nor participation but an elaborate shell game of blameshifting and credit-taking.
Pragmatic and circumspect though the Supreme Court has been
in advancing federalism, recent decisions provide some indication
that the Justices’ increased confidence and resolve to assert constitutional norms even in anticipation of potent political opposition and
public criticism. The civil remedies provision of the Violence Against
Women Act at issue in Morrison was a feminist icon: still, the Court
declared it unconstitutional. In its present Term, the Court will consider whether Congress may abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amend64
ment immunity under the Americans With Disabilities Act; the
prospect that the Court might curtail the scope of this well-nigh sacrosanct statute has already prompted journalistic alarm and invective.65 Even environmental regulation may no longer be immune
from the sweep of the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence:
in Solid Waste Agency, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
the Justices will decide whether the Commerce Clause enables the
federal government to regulate local, in-state wetlands whose sole
connection to interstate commerce is to serve as a migratory bird
habitat.66
Even if—and especially if—the Supreme Court were to further
advance its constitutional agenda in these cases, Laidlaw will in retrospect look like a missed opportunity. Solid Waste Agency will at most
remove one tiny brick from a regulatory edifice built on political irresponsibility. Laidlaw was a chance to remove one of its cornerstones.
The Justices’ reluctance to take that step is understandable, but nonetheless regrettable.

the production of a clean environment”).
64. See Garrett v. University of Ala. Bd. of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 529 U.S. 1065 (2000).
65. See, e.g., Are the States Above the Law? WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2000, at A32 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity decisions as “perverse” and arguing that a finding of state immunity from damage suits under the Americans With Disabilities Act “would not
just be harmful, but constitutionally indefensible”).
66. See Solid Waste Agency, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7th
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000).

